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Ideal utilitarianism states that the only fundamental requirement of morality is to
promote a plurality of intrinsic goods for all those capable of possessing them. This
moral framework flourished in the middle part of the period between Henry Sidgwick
and A. C. Ewing. It was defended by John Laird, H.W. B. Joseph, G. E. Moore, and
Hastings Rashdall, among others. According to Ewing: ‘The best expositions of this
type of view in English are Moore’s Principia Ethica and Ethics and Rashdall’s Theory of
Good and Evil.’1 Moore’s arguments for ideal utilitarianism are well known, and
therefore serve as the focus of most discussions of it.2 Rashdall’s are not, despite the
fact that his The Theory of Good and Evil was referred to in his time as ‘certainly at least
one of the most important works on ethical theory of our generation’.3 The discussions
that do focus on both Moore and Rashdall ignore or obscure the fact that they do not
employ the same gamut of arguments for the position.4 In a series of articles and books
which began appearing near the end of the nineteenth century Rashdall produced
distinct arguments for the view.5 To properly understand the development of ideal
utilitarianism it is therefore necessary to consider Rashdall’s contribution to it.
* I wish to thank Roger Crisp, Robert Shaver, Emily Kress, an anonymous referee for Oxford University
Press and, especially, Thomas Hurka for extremely valuable written comments on previous drafts.
1 A. C. Ewing, ‘Recent Developments in British Ethical Thought’, in C. A. Mace (ed.), British Philosophy
in the Mid-Century: A Cambridge Symposium (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), 69.
2 See e.g. Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960); Tim Mulgan,
Understanding Utilitarianism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007); William H. Shaw, Contemporary Ethics: Taking
Account of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); Julia Driver, ‘The History of Utilitarianism’, in Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2009/entries/utilitarianism-history/; and Ewing, ‘Recent Developments’.
3 William K. Wright, ‘Review of Hastings Rashdall, Is Conscience an Emotion?’, Philosophical Review, 25
(1916), 81.
4 See e.g. Geoffrey Scarre, Utilitarianism (London: Routledge, 1996).
5 Works by Rashdall are abbreviated as follows. TGE 1 and TGE 2: The Theory of Good and Evil, vols. 1
and 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1907); PU: ‘Professor Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism’, Mind, 10 (1885);
E: Ethics (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913); CE: Is Conscience an Emotion? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1914).
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The principal aim of this chapter is to provide a reconstruction and critical evaluation
of Rashdall’s main arguments for ideal utilitarianism, with special emphasis on how
they compare with Moore’s arguments. In section I, I briefly outline the basic features
of his ethical outlook. In section II, I consider two different positive arguments that
Rashdall provides for its theory of rightness, one of which relies on definitions of moral
terms and one of which relies on an appeal to abstract self-evident propositions. I raise
worries about both argumentative strategies. In section III, I discuss his arguments in
favour of a pluralist theory of value. I argue that Rashdall’s most promising argument
relies on an appeal to common-sense morality. In section IV, I conclude by sketching
how Rashdall makes a more lasting contribution to the defence of ideal utilitarianism
than does Moore.
I
Rashdall’s ideal utilitarianism contains both a theory of rightness and a theory of value.
He holds that the morality of an action, rule, policy, or institution is determined solely
by the value or goodness of the state of affairs that it results in (TGE 1.100, 184, 219;
E 60, 71). For Rashdall, the ‘right action is always that which (so far as the agent has
the means of knowing) will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole’
(TGE 1.184).6 The value of a state of affairs is determined not only by the sum total of
pleasure that the state of affairs includes, but by the sum total of the goods of virtue,
knowledge, and pleasure (TGE 1.76; E 69–70; CE 44).7 These values are ‘intuitively
discerned and compared with one another by the moral or practical Reason’ (TGE
1.184; also 100). They function to assess the value of a life as a whole rather than how
things are going at a particular moment or time in a life (TGE 1.220; TGE 2.40; E 71).
Rashdall does not think that the goods which make up the conception of the ultimate
end are of the same axiological significance. He holds that virtue is more important
than intellectual activity which is more important than mere pleasant feeling (TGE
1.76, 191; CE 44). He further contends that a sufficient amount of a lower good can
outweigh a lesser amount of a higher good (TGE 2.42 ff.; E 68).8
II
G. E. Moore defends a similar view. His arguments for the theory of rightness
associated with ideal utilitarianism are not terribly robust. In Principia Ethica he argues
6 Rashdall, perhaps misleadingly, often states that the right action is that which has a tendency to produce
the greatest amount of good on the whole (e.g. TGE 1.184; E 77).
7 He sometimes appears to add a fourth good, ‘various kinds of affection or social emotion’ (E 70; also
TGE 2.37).
8 Scarre overlooks the fact that Rashdall thinks that virtue may be outweighed by a sufficient amount of a
lower good. His ignorance of this fact allows him to claim that Rashdall is actually a virtue theorist. By noting
this aspect of Rashdall’s view one may block Scarre’s suggestion. See Scarre, Utilitarianism, 120–1.
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that ‘right’ means ‘what will not cause less good than any possible alternative’ and that
‘duty’ means that ‘which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any
possible alternative’.9 Therefore, a position about what is right or what one has a duty
to do falls out of a proper analysis of the concept of ‘right’ or ‘duty’. Rashdall seems at
times to incline toward this metaethical position. He argues that ‘good’ is ‘logically the
primary conception’, and that ‘right’ just means that ‘which tends to bring about
the good’ (TGE 1.135; also E 14, 61). Indeed, he submits that ‘the idea of “right” is
meaningless apart from a “good” which right actions tend to promote’ (TGE 1.138;
also TGE 2.42). This explains why (a) he often remarks that ‘in ultimate analysis all
moral judgements may be reduced to . . . judgements of value’ (E 77, italics in original;
also TGE 1.93, 137, 148, 184; CE 45), and why (b) he seems to think that the claims
‘the greater good ought always to be preferred to the less’ and ‘it is always right to
promote the greatest possible good’ are equivalent (CE 41; E 40).
In a review of Principia Ethica, Bertrand Russell argues contra Moore that ‘it might be
proved, in the course of moral exhortation, that such and such an action would have
the best results; and yet the person exhorted might inquire why he should perform the
action’.10 In other words, Russell rightly notes, Moore’s own definition of rightness
seems to be susceptible to the open-question argument. This convinced Moore.11
Russell’s criticism is equally effective against Rashdall. In his critical attack on hedo-
nism, Rashdall notes that ‘good’ does not mean ‘pleasure’, since ‘pleasure is good’ is not
identical to ‘pleasure is pleasant’, and therefore not a tautology (TGE 1.48; also E 16,
22). Following Russell, one may argue against Rashdall that ‘right’ does not mean ‘that
which produces the greatest good possible’, since ‘the right action is that which
produces the greatest good possible’ is not identical to ‘the action which produces
the greatest good possible produces the greatest good possible’, and therefore not a
tautology. It is instead a significant proposition: one can be told that an act produces
the greatest net good in the circumstances and yet still doubt that it is right or
obligatory. A second worry arises for Rashdall: his definitional claims are in tension
with his treatment of non-utilitarian moral frameworks. He treats them as intelligible
options. The difficulty is that if ‘right’ has no meaning other than ‘means to the greatest
attainable good’, then the non-utilitarian positions that Rashdall discusses are strictly
speaking unintelligible.12
In Ethics, Moore provides a different argument for ideal utilitarianism. He contends
that ‘it seems to me to be self-evident that knowingly to do an action which would
9 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 148; italics in original;
also 181 (henceforth abbreviated as PE).
10 Bertrand Russell, ‘The Meaning of Good’, in Russell on Ethics, ed. Charles R. Pigden (London:
Routledge, 1999), 101.
11 G. E. Moore, ‘A Reply to My Critics’, in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Chicago:
Northwestern University Press, 1942), 558. See also G. E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1912 (1961 reprint)), 107–8, for a denial of the claim that ‘right’means ‘that which causes maximal goodness’.
12 Moore does not have this problem. He does not discuss rival moral views in the way Rashdall does (at
least in Principia).
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make the world, on the whole, really and truly worse than if we had acted differently,
must always be wrong’.13 He wields this against non-utilitarian moral views and
egoism.14 Rashdall seems at times to express sympathy with an argument that involves
appeal to self-evident propositions. He accepts the following such propositions, that (1)
‘I ought to promote my own good on the whole (where no one else’s good is
affected)’, (2) ‘I ought to regard a larger good for society in general as of more intrinsic
value than a smaller good’, and (3) ‘I ought to regard the good of one man as of equal
intrinsic value with the like good of any one else’ (TGE 1.90–1, 147, 184–5; also 242,
222, 263). He relies mainly on benevolence, (2), and equity or justice, (3) (E 77; CE
41–2).15 He argues that these propositions oblige us to promote the universal good
(TGE 1.91;CE 42–3), that they ‘direct us as to the way we are to distribute “the good”
when we know what it is’ (TGE 1.148; also 224, 112), and that though these self-
evident propositions do not tell us which ‘particular actions are right or wrong’, they
do tell us what is right or wrong in general (CE 42; TGE 1.112). He claims to borrow
these from Henry Sidgwick, and with him Rashdall argues that these are the ‘principles
upon which a rational Utilitarianism is founded’ (E 77; also TGE 1.91, 147).16
Moore’s appeal to self-evidence is starker than Rashdall’s.17 The former simply
asserts that ideal utilitarianism’s theory of rightness is self-evidently true, and that the
falsity of rival views follows as a result. Moore does not attempt to examine candidate
self-evident propositions in order to determine which are acceptable, and only then
conclude that the only acceptable intuitions support utilitarianism. This is Rashdall’s
strategy. He offers us his self-evident propositions in the context of an argument
(following Sidgwick) aimed at showing that utilitarianism is based on a set of self-
evident propositions, the truth of which emerges from an assessment of rival views of
what is self-evidently true (TGE 1.83–91; E 51–60). The argument seems to be that
the only truly plausible self-evident propositions are the ones Rashdall lists, and these
support utilitarianism.
But this raises a question. How does Rashdall get from the propositions that he
thinks are self-evident to the account of rightness in ideal utilitarianism? He suggests at
one point that rational or right conduct consists in ‘acting with a clear conception of
13 Moore, Ethics, 112, italics in original; also 143.
14 Ibid. 109–13, 141–3.
15 Rashdall drops the intuition of prudence (1) in later writings (CE 42, 183 n. 1). He sometimes suggests,
following Sidgwick, that prudence amounts to the requirement of temporal neutrality (PU 202). In this
case, it has some role in his argument appealing to self-evident propositions. That he is committed to some
kind of temporal neutrality seems implied by his claims about the rights of future generations (TGE 1.228).
16 For an account of the self-evident intuitions on which Sidgwick relies, see Henry Sidgwick, The
Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London: Macmillan, 1907), 379–82, 400–1 (henceforth abbreviated asME ). For a
discussion of Sidgwick’s intuitions and the role they play in his argument for utilitarianism, see Anthony
Skelton, ‘Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitions’, Etica and Politica/Ethics and Politics, 10 (2008).
17 Rashdall does claim at one point that it is self-evident that ‘it is always right to promote the greatest
possible good’ (CE 41; also TGE 1.110). This is bolder than his usual claims, though less bold than Moore’s
claim, because this statement is consistent with the claim that it is not wrong not to promote the greatest
possible good.
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our ultimate purpose or aim, and taking the means which seem best adapted to attain
that end’ (TGE 1.83–4). His view seems to be that the self-evident propositions of
benevolence and equity support the idea that the end that it is right to aim at is
maximum social or aggregate good, since a larger amount of the good is always
preferable to a smaller amount and since one person’s good is to be treated as of the
same intrinsic importance as the like good of another person in distributing the good.
The burden for the argument lies in showing that these are the only claims regarding
how to appropriately distribute the good and in demonstrating that right conduct
consists in ‘acting with a clear conception of our ultimate purpose or aim, and taking
the means which seem best adapted to attain that end’ (TGE 1.83–4). Whether this
argument succeeds is something we can conclude only after examining Rashdall’s main
argument against intuitionism, the view that ‘actions are pronounced right or wrong
a priori without reference to their consequences’ (TGE 1.80; also E 45).18 If this
negative argument is successful, he is free (it seems) to move from the more modest
claims in the self-evident propositions to the stronger claims that one finds in his
statements of ideal utilitarianism.
This leads us to Rashdall’s main argument against intuitionism (TGE 1.83–91;
E 51–60). The argument begins by noting some of the defects of the intuitionist’s
main moral rules: they are often vague, in some cases they conflict with each other, and
they admit of exceptions. This is true of, for instance, the rules of justice and promise-
keeping. Typically, Rashdall contends, we appeal to consequences to make the rules
more precise, to adjudicate conflicts between them and to justify exceptions to them.
However, if the more precise rules, the solutions to the conflicts, and the exceptions
are justified on the basis of the consequences of acting on them, it follows that in every
case in which we act we must determine the outcome of the action in order to
determine whether or not the rule or its specification applies, and therefore to
determine the morality of the action. It cannot, he continues, logically ‘ever be right
to exclude consideration of consequences’ (TGE 1.87; italics in original; also E 59),
from which it follows that only consequences matter to morality (E 60). To this he adds
another argument, that in order to determine the morality of, for instance, the act of
drunkenness, we must look at its consequences, for ‘some consequences are included in
the meaning of the act’ (E 58, italics in original).19 But, ‘once admit that consequences
must be considered at all, and it is arbitrary to stop at any particular point in the calculus
of social effects’ (TGE 1.88; also E 58, 59). His basic point appears to be that we do not
know what we are required to do until we have figured out the full consequences of
our actions, from which it follows that ‘it is irrational to judge of the morality of an
action without tracing its bearing upon human Well-being as a whole’ (TGE 1.91),
18 Rashdall also provides (effective) arguments against Kant (TGE 1.108 ff.). I do not discuss these. Doing
so would lead me too far afield.
19 Drunkenness makes a man, for example, ‘thick in his speech, unsteady in his gait, erratic in his conduct,
incoherent in his thoughts, and so on’ (E 58).
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from which it follows that only consequences matter to morality, from which it follows
that ‘Intuitionism must be regarded as an impossible and obsolete mode of ethical
thought’ (E 60).
This is not a very good argument. It certainly appears to have had no impact on
Rashdall’s anti-utilitarian rivals H. A. Prichard, W. D. Ross, and E. F. Carritt.20 Ross,
for instance, seems to accept that before we can determine that it is right to express
gratitude or to keep a promise we need to figure out the consequences of acting on the
requirements to keep promises and to express gratitude.21 However, he contends that
it does not follow from the fact that we need to appeal to consequences to figure out
what to do that only consequences matter. The argument that Rashdall provides
appears to be a non sequitur. This is presumably in part why it failed to convince rivals.
There is a deeper worry about Rashdall’s argument. Elsewhere he argues that all
valuable states of consciousness are pleasurable—in part because all desire satisfaction is
pleasurable (E 18; TGE 2.53; PU 212)—and that if a state of consciousness fails to be
pleasurable, then it is no longer valuable regardless of the other elements that it
contains. ‘Value is not a feeling, but it cannot be recognised as attributable to anything
in consciousness which can excite no feeling of pleasure in its possessor’ (TGE 1.153–4;
also 66, 67, 118 n. 2, 219–20; TGE 2.37, 38; E 69). More tellingly, he writes that ‘the
value of some things is not measured by their pleasantness, but the value of other things
surely does cease to exist when they cease to be pleasant. We must, therefore, be able to
estimate their pleasantness before we can pronounce upon their value, and compare
that value with the value of things which do not owe their value entirely to their
pleasantness’ (TGE 2.51). Rashdall does not infer from the fact that we need to
determine that a state of consciousness is pleasurable to assess its value that the only
thing that ultimately matters is pleasure. That is, he does not conclude from the fact
that a valuable state of consciousness must be pleasurable that only pleasure matters. He
wants to resist this implication. He thinks things in addition to pleasure determine the
value of a state of consciousness. Pleasure is merely a necessary condition for a state of
affairs to be intrinsically valuable.
But note that this is a conclusion quite different from the one that Rashdall comes to
in his argument against intuitionism. He argues that because we have to determine all
of the consequences of an action before we determine its nature and its morality only
consequences matter to morality. He does not, however, conclude that only pleasure
matters from the fact that we have to determine that a state of affairs is pleasurable
to determine its axiological status. What accounts for the different strategies and
20 H. A. Prichard, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’,Mind, 21 (1912), and ‘What Is the Basis of
Moral Obligation?’, in Prichard, Moral Writings, ed. Jim MacAdam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002)
(henceforth abbreviated as RM and MO respectively); W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1930), 17–37 (henceforth abbreviated as RG); E. F. Carritt, The Theory of Morals (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1928).
21 Ross, RG 41–2. For the same point, see W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1939), 90, 99.
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conclusions in the two cases? The general argument against intuitionism seems to be a
non sequitur. For intuitionism’s defenders can concede Rashdall’s claim about the need
to determine all of the consequences of one’s actions, but argue that (like Rashdall in
the instance discussed above) it is still the case that things other than consequences
matter to the morality of an action.22 Rashdall seems to agree that it would be a non
sequitur to argue that because we have to determine the pleasantness of a state of
consciousness before determining its value therefore only pleasure is intrinsically
valuable. He would reject a hedonist argument according to which his claim about
pleasure entails that hedonism is true. But he gives us no reason for accepting his
argument against intuitionism and for rejecting a hedonist argument of the same
variety.
Rashdall does, of course, claim that an analysis of our moral consciousness reveals
that more than pleasure matters (E 28; TGE 2.37, 53; CE 43–4). This will not
help. For Ross, Prichard, and Carritt may do the same in support of their view that
there is a plurality of moral requirements. In fact, Sidgwick, Carritt, Ross, and Prichard
all agree that common-sense morality contains deontological elements. Sidgwick states
that the key element of common-sense morality is that ‘we have the power of seeing
clearly that certain kinds of actions are right and reasonable in themselves, apart from
their consequences;—or rather with a merely partial consideration of consequences,
from which other consequences admitted to be possibly good or bad are definitely
excluded’.23 Ross claims of the moral philosopher that ‘the verdicts of the moral
consciousness of the best people are the foundation on which he must build’, and
that this leads him to the view that the fact that an ‘act will produce the best possible
consequences is not . . . [the] reason for calling it right’.24 Prichard declares that it is
improper to imply that ‘there is a common reason why all right acts are right’, and that
it is a mistake to attempt to show by means of a theory like ideal utilitarianism that we
ought, for example, to keep our promises, since attempting to prove that we have
certain obligations assumes ‘the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended
directly by an act of moral thinking’.25 Carritt asserts that ‘we believe we have various
kinds of obligations, for which we can discover no common ground, arising out of the
various situations in which we think ourselves’.26
Rashdall’s ideal utilitarianism appears to be caught between the more reformist and
systematic classical utilitarianism of Sidgwick and the less or not overly systematic and
more conservative pluralism of Ross. Sidgwick holds that the moral philosopher’s job is
to ‘enunciate, in full breadth and clearness, those primary intuitions of Reason, by the
22 Indeed, Ross, Carritt, and Prichard claim that the promotion of good outcomes is a necessary condition
on obligation. See Ross,RG 36, 162; Carritt, The Theory of Morals, 41–2, 54, 86, 139; and Prichard, MO 2–3,
and RM 25. Thanks to Robert Shaver for this point and the references.
23 Sidgwick, ME 200.
24 Ross, RG 41, also 20 n. 1; and RG 17, also 34–9.
25 Prichard, MO 1; RM 36.
26 E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), 69.
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scientific application of which the common moral thought of mankind may be at once
systematised and corrected’.27 Indeed, the moral philosopher is intended to ‘tell men
what they ought to think, rather than what they do think’.28 He is to provide system
and unity even at the expense of conflict with common-sense morality.29 System is of
such importance to Sidgwick that one of his main arguments against rivals to hedonism
is that they fail to provide plausible accounts of how to ‘systematise human activities’.30
Rashdall appears to approve of this modus operandi in the case of what makes right acts
right. He maintains, for example, that:
if we are to attempt to defend these maxims of Justice and Benevolence as valid and self-
consistent judgements of the practical Reason, it is a matter of life and death to our position to
find either a common denominator, in terms of which both principles could be expressed, or at
least some third principle which should govern us in deciding between their respective claims—
in deciding when to sacrifice quantity of good in favour of just distribution, and when to sacrifice
justice of distribution in order that there may be more good to distribute. (TGE 1.266–7;
also E 57)
His hostility to pluralist views of rightness is manifest. He thinks it is irrational to
hold pluralist views denying that only consequences matter to the morality of actions
(TGE 1.89–90, 134; E 59), though he concedes that this is the view of common sense
(TGE 1.83).
Ross maintains that his job is to describe what ‘we’ really think, morally speaking.31
Indeed, for him ‘the main moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to be, not
opinions which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but knowledge from the
start’.32 These verdicts may contain some infelicities that it is the moral philosopher’s job
to eliminate on the basis of sober reflection.33 But when the ironed-out verdicts conflict
with ethical principles like Rashdall’s, then, Ross thinks, it is ‘absurd’ to ‘repudiate’ our
‘actual apprehension’ of what is morally required of us.34 It is, after all, more important
to have a moral view that fits with the facts than a moral position that is theoretically
elegant or simpler.35 This is the attitude that Rashdall holds in the case of his theory of
value (PU 225; TGE 1.72–3). He claims that ‘the only way of showing that pleasure is
not the true end of life is by an appeal to one’s own moral consciousness and that of
others so far as it is revealed byword and deed’ (TGE 1.70). But it is hard to combine this
attitude with the one that Rashdall displays in his discussion of rival theories of rightness,
where he seems hostile towhat is a common-sense position. It seems odd to be so hostile
to common sense in the case of what is right but not in the case of what is good, without
some very compelling reason to be so. Rashdall himself provides no such reason. His
position is therefore an unstable middle view between uniformly monistic classical
utilitarianism on the one hand and uniformly pluralistic deontological intuitionism on
27 Sidgwick, ME 373–4. 28 Ibid. 373. 29 Ibid. 6.
30 Ibid. 406. 31 Ross, RG 39. 32 Ibid. 20–1 n. 1.
33 Ibid. and 41; also Ross, Foundations, 1, 189–90. 34 Ross, RG 40. 35 Ibid. 19.
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the other. The classical utilitarian does not encounter Rashdall’s problem, since she
argues that both the arguments against intuitionism and pluralism about the good must
have the same structure. Both arguments must function to revise common-sense
morality in line with monism. The Rossian, too, can insist that the arguments have
the same structure. Both the theory of rightness and the theory of value must seek to
capture the main elements of common-sense morality. It appears that Rashdall’s argu-
ments for and view about pleasure and valuable states of consciousness is at odds with the
sort of argument he runs against intuitionism, for the arguments that are taken to
impugn intuitionism are not taken to impugn his axiological pluralism.
Moore seems tempted by Rashdall’s idea that all valuable states of affairs must
contain some pleasure. In Principia he suggests that ‘it might even be maintained that
it is only wholes, in which some pleasure is included, that possess any great value’.36 In
Ethics, he contends that it is not implausible to hold that ‘no whole can ever have any
intrinsic value unless it contains some pleasure’.37 Moore appears not to encounter
Rashdall’s problem, since Moore does not rely on the same sort of counter-argument
in his dismissal of non-utilitarian competitors.38 He does open himself up to another
objection (if, in fact, he agrees that all valuable wholes must contain some pleasure).39
He argues that what has attracted many of its proponents to hedonism is the claim that
all valuable wholes must contain some pleasure. They have erroneously inferred from
this that only pleasure has intrinsic value, and that the value of a whole is always in
proportion to the quantity of pleasure it contains. Their reasoning is as follows: ‘let us
call the pleasure which such a whole contains, A, and the whole remainder, whatever it
may be, B. We are then saying that the whole A þ B is intrinsically good, but that B is
not intrinsically good at all. Surely it seems to follow that the intrinsic value of A þ B
cannot possibly be greater than that of A by itself.’40 Moore argues that this simply does
not follow. It might be true that a whole containing only knowledge has no intrinsic
value and that the intrinsic value of a whole containing both knowledge and pleasure
has a value that is not strictly proportionate to the value of the pleasure alone. Moore
rejects the claim that, ‘where a whole contains two factors, A and B, and one of these,
B, has no intrinsic goodness at all, the intrinsic value of the whole cannot be greater than
that of the other factor, A’.41 Moore calls this the ‘principle of organic unities’.42 It
claims that ‘the amount by which the value of a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is not
necessarily equal to that of the remaining factor . . . the degree of intrinsic value of a whole is
not always in proportion to the quantity of pleasure it contains’.43
36 Moore, PE 213, italics in original.
37 Moore, Ethics, 148, also 150, 153, italics in original.
38 Nor does he seem to defend his value theory by reference to common-sense axiological claims.
39 For Moore’s diffidence, see Ethics, 150. It must be noted that to reject this view would render his
position at least somewhat unacceptable.
40 Ibid. 148–9, italics in original.
41 Ibid. 150, italics in original.
42 Moore does not use this description in Ethics. See, instead, Moore, PE 27–36, 184.
43 Moore, Ethics, 151–2, italics in original.
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A similar objection might be launched against Moore’s own view of rightness. It
might be argued that what has attracted its proponents to the utilitarian view of
rightness is the fact that all right actions must produce good outcomes. What the
proponents of the utilitarian view of rightness have inferred from this claim is that only
good outcomes matter to determining the morality of an action. However, while it
might be the case that, say, an equitable economic distribution in the absence of good
outcomes on balance is not morally obligatory, it does not follow that only good
outcomes matter to the morality of an action. It might be the case that when an
equitable economic distribution produces on balance good outcomes and we are
choosing between this and another action producing the same amount of good on
balance, but not involving an equitable economic distribution, that we ought to do
that which produces the equitable distribution, because the morality of the action is
affected (in this case) both by good outcomes and the fact that it involves an equitable
economic distribution. Moore’s own view of rightness is open (it seems) to an
objection that he registers against hedonism. It does not follow from the fact that all
right acts have good outcomes that only good outcomes matter to morality.
The fact that there are tensions in the arguments that Moore and Rashdall provide
does not entail that the view of rightness that they defend is false. But the only thing
that Rashdall and Moore have left when their arguments are turned aside is the claim
that the view of rightness to which ideal utilitarians subscribe is self-evident.44 This
claim remains deeply counter-intuitive to many, and Moore and Rashdall do seem to
need to provide dissenters with reasons for accepting it. As Sidgwick puts it, ‘when we
are dealing with any subject where there is a conflict of opinion as to first principles, we
can hardly refuse to give reasons for taking our side in the conflict: as rational beings
conversing with other rationals it seems absurd that we should not be able to explain to
each other why we accept [apart from noting its self-evidence] one first principle rather
than another’.45
Moore and Rashdall might therefore try a different tack. They might argue that in
the case of the right, deviations from the requirement to promote the good are
paradoxical (E 53).46 Of intuitionism Rashdall and Moore might ask: Why is it right
to refrain from x-ing (e.g. lying) when by x-ing (lying) one can prevent more x-ing
(lying) from occurring (TGE 1.194)? It is paradoxical that we have a reason not to lie
which is not in addition a reason to prevent more lying from occurring. In the case of
the good no such paradox occurs when one, say, deviates from what has maximum net
pleasure or opts for another value, for example, knowledge or virtue, at the expense of
pleasure. It is not clear that there is anything paradoxical about sacrificing some pleasure
for virtue. Admittedly, this is a controversial point, and it may not move Rashdall’s and
44 Rashdall may not have this, though he could simply revert to Moore’s view.
45 Henry Sidgwick, ‘The Establishment of Ethical First Principles’, Mind, 4 (1879), 106.
46 For this worry, see e.g. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974),
30–2; and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 178 ff.
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Moore’s deontological rivals. But at the very least it puts their opponents on the
defensive, and this may suffice in this case.
III
Rashdall’s theory of rightness is controversial and his arguments do not fare well under
scrutiny. His legacy does not, therefore, lie in his defence of it. He also defends value
pluralism. Pluralism about the good was popular in Rashdall’s time, even amongst
those who rejected his theory of rightness.47 It is therefore important to consider his
arguments. It seems that his lasting contribution lies in his defence of this (popular)
view.
Rashdall’s main target is hedonism. He offers several arguments against the view.
The one that he relies on most heavily explicitly engages Sidgwick.48 Rashdall argues
that Sidgwick’s theory contains at its core an internal or ‘psychological contradiction’
(E 64; also TGE 1.58), which forces him to abandon hedonism. The argument runs as
follows: P1. Sidgwick says that ‘as a rational being I am bound to aim at good
generally,—so far as it is attainable by my efforts,—not merely at a particular part of
it’.49 P2. Rational requirements generate a desire to do what is right and reasonable as
such in rational agents.50 C1. Therefore, the rational agent has a desire to aim at good
generally. P3. Acting on the desire to aim at good generally may lead to self-sacrifice.
P4. Self-sacrifice has no intrinsic value for the hedonist.51 P5. This means that the
rational agent will think (at least in numerous cases) both that he ought (or has
conclusive reason) to be motivated to do the right thing and that this is a ‘dead loss
to himself ’ (E 64; also PU 217).52 P6. This state of mind is ‘an impossible’ one, or ‘at all
events one so rare that it might fairly be described as pathological’ (E 64; also TGE
1.57). C2. Therefore, at the heart of Sidgwick’s view there is a ‘psychological contra-
diction’ (E 64; also TGE 1.58). P7. In fact, the argument continues, ‘the conviction
that there is such a thing as duty, that one kind of conduct is intrinsically reasonable or
right and another kind of conduct is intrinsically unreasonable or wrong, has almost
invariably gone along with the conviction that right conduct, or the character or
disposition which results in right conduct, is in and for itself a good and the greatest of
goods’ (E 64; TGE 1.59). If virtue is not an intrinsic good, then there is no subjective
motive for acting in accord with the requirement to promote the good.
The whole force of the subjective hold which the precept ‘be reasonable’ has exercised over me,
so long as I was unacquainted with the teachings of rational Utilitarianism, has lain in its
47 See e.g. Ross, RG 134–41; Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking, 83–95; and (it seems) Prichard, MO 5;
RM 29.
48 For versions of this argument, see PU 215–22; TGE 1.53–9; and E 63–5. I construe it as being primarily
about motivation.
49 Sidgwick, ME 382.
50 Ibid. 34. 51 Ibid. 400–1. 52 Ibid. 502.
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inseparable connexion with another conviction—that it was intrinsically noble for me to act in
this way, and that to act in accordance with the reasonable was a good to me, a greater good than
I could obtain by pursuing the pleasure which you tell me is the only true good. (TGE 1.57–8;
also 59)
P8. Reason does provide a subjective motive for acting in accordance with the
requirement to promote the good (TGE 1.57, 59): a theory which fails to provide a
‘logical basis for that rational justification of the individual life of Duty . . . must be
relegated to the domain of poetry’ (PU 226). C3. Therefore, virtue is a good and (for
Rashdall) the highest good.
Rashdall took this to be a devastating blow to Sidgwick’s hedonism, but his
argument seems to apply equally to views other than hedonism, for example, the
view according to which only knowledge, achievement and pleasure, but not virtue or
a rightly oriented will, are intrinsically good. In this case, as in the case of hedonism,
virtue is at best an instrumental good. Rashdall will no doubt argue that this view kills
the impulse to promote the good by denying virtue intrinsic value. The ‘inner logic’ of
these views compels their proponents to endorse the view that virtue or the rightly
directed will is intrinsically good.
One initial worry about the argument is that Rashdall writes as if there is no
motivation to do what is right unless there is a benefit to the agent.53 This suggests
that one is motivated only by one’s own good. This seems to be in tension with
Rashdall’s rejection of psychological egoism, which he concludes is ‘hopelessly at
variance with psychological facts’ (E 20). More specifically, he rejects the view on
the grounds that there are disinterested desires, one example of which is the desire to
promote things other than one’s own (greatest) good (TGE 1.27–9, 38–43; E 16–21).
In reply, Rashdall can note that he does explicitly say that there is a desire to do what is
right and reasonable, but that it only ‘sometimes induces . . . [agents] actually to do the
reasonable thing even at the cost of their own good (i.e. pleasure) rather than the
unreasonable’, and that its powers have been ‘enormously exaggerated’ (E 63–4; CE
114). Rashdall seems to think that we are sometimes (albeit rarely) motivated to do the
right thing by its reasonableness at a cost to ourselves, but often we are not: in these
latter, more numerous cases the thought that virtue is intrinsically good supplies the
remaining motivation.
But two further objections arise. First, Sidgwick might reply that if agents demand
compensation or some kind of benefit in order to obey moral requirements, then they
are best understood as agents who are unconcerned with morality. If this is so, then
they seem to be the kind of creature who is unmoved by moral or rational considera-
tions, and it is not clear that (a) positing that virtue has value or that value lies in a
correctly oriented will is able to supply what Rashdall requires, or that (b) we should be
terribly worried about these sorts of individuals (at least in moral philosophy). If one
53 I owe this objection to Thomas Hurka.
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needs extra motives beyond what reason or rightness itself provides to act morally, then
one seems uncommitted to morality, just as one who requires incentives to be just
might be assumed to be uncommitted to the most plausible principles of justice.
Second, Rashdall’s argument turns on an empirical claim. He suggests this when he
writes that ‘the acceptance of rationalistic Hedonism kills and eradicates all those
impulses upon which it has to depend for the practical fulfilment of its own precepts’,
that ‘the desire to escape . . . one-sidedness is not by itself a very powerful motive of
conduct when it is pronounced to have no intrinsic value’ (TGE 1.58), and that the
motive to do the right thing is weak (TGE 1.57; CE 114). However, if acceptance is
the problem, then perhaps the right reply for the hedonist is to simply discourage
acceptance rather than to reject his view. It is certainly open to the hedonist to
encourage the adoption of ends other than hedonism if she thinks this will promote
more pleasure over the long run. Furthermore, if the desire to escape one-sidedness
really is less than potent, then the hedonist could advocate for the education of desire so
that agents will be motivated more thoroughly by the natural desire ‘that there should
be harmony between . . . [their] feelings and aims and those of . . . [their] fellow crea-
tures’,54 or come to see that pleasure and the absence of pain is an end which ‘satisfies
our imagination by its vastness, and sustains our resolution by its comparative
security’.55
Moore does not rely on this sort of argument against Sidgwick’s hedonism. Instead,
his arguments rely on reflective intuition and on the use of the isolation method.56 Like
Moore, Rashdall believes that there are self-evident intuitions which pertain to his
claims about what has intrinsic value, though he shows no sign of employing the
isolation method. In describing his view, he writes that, ‘besides this preference of the
truly good in conduct or character there were many other elements in the ideal state of
a human soul besides the Altruism of its volitions and the pleasantness of its sensations;
and when we faced the question, how we know these things to be good in various
degrees, we were obliged to answer “We know it intuitively or immediately . . . ”’
(TGE 1.100; also E 22, 40; CE 43; TGE 1.93).57 On the basis of these intuitions
Rashdall suggests that we can explain and justify the thoughts that some pleasures are
bad, for example, pleasures taken in cruelty and lust (E 70; TGE 1.73, 98–100), and
that some pleasures are more important than others irrespective of intensity and
duration (TGE 1.72, 73; E 67–9; TGE 2.33, 38; CE 44).58 In so doing, he thinks
54 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 79.
55 Sidgwick, ME 404.
56 See e.g. Moore, PE 83–5, 92–4, 187 ff.; Moore, Ethics, 146–7.
57 Rashdall notes that in saying that something is immediately known he means that our knowledge of it is
‘not obtained by inference or deduction from something else in the way in which the Utilitarian supposes his
judgements to be deductions from rules got by generalization from experience’ (TGE 1.93 n. 1).
58 These views were widely held amongst Rashdall’s contemporaries; see e.g. Ross, RG 136–8, and
Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking, 92–3. For recent hedonist replies, see Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and Robert Shaver, ‘The Appeal of Utilitarianism’, Utilitas, 16
(2004).
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‘the more glaring discrepancies between logical Utilitarianism and the moral ideal
recognized by most good men will disappear’ (E 65; also TGE 1.72). Rashdall takes the
argument for his self-evident intuitions even further than this. He holds that ideal
utilitarianism has practical implications that are more acceptable to common-sense
thinking than those of classical utilitarianism, and that this affords a further mechanism
for the defence and the epistemic justification of it (PU 219; TGE 1.189–215; E 65–7).
Moore agrees with Rashdall that, for example, cruelty and lust are ‘great positive evils’
because they involve loving what is evil.59 But he does not seem to argue that
intuitions—for example, that virtue is intrinsically good—are further justified by the
fact that they are able to explain and justify elements of ‘ordinary moral consciousness’
(TGE 1.73; also 72, 97). Nor does Moore attempt to defend the view by showing how
it has more palatable practical implications than its rivals.
These differences betweenMoore and Rashdall point to unique and novel aspects of
the latter’s defence of ideal utilitarianism. Moore fails to exploit these avenues for
two reasons. First, he accepts a specific view about self-evidence, according to which
a self-evident proposition is one for which no reason can be given.60 Rashdall seems
sometimes to agree with Moore about self-evidence (see e.g. TGE 1.100). However,
his general argumentative strategy suggests otherwise. Indeed, he seems to rely on an
epistemology that involves appealing to self-evidence and coherence with common-
sense morality for justification.61 Second, Moore denies that differences in value theory
entail differences in practical directives.62 In a rather snotty review of The Theory of
Good and Evil, Moore took Rashdall to task for not adequately demonstrating practical
divergence between ideal and hedonistic utilitarianism, arguing that ‘obviously every
action which does in fact produce a maximum balance of pleasure might always also
produce such other results as would give the total a maximum of intrinsic value; and
considering how immensely complicated the total results of actual actions are, it is very
difficult to be sure that this is not the case’.63 Yet, it is not implausible to think that a
divergence between the two views will occur in practice.64
At any rate, Rashdall advocates for divergence, and he exploits the putative diver-
gence to his advantage. He argues that ideal utilitarianism is more plausible than
59 Moore, PE 208; for his arguments, see 208–11.
60 Ibid., pp. x, 143, 148–9. Ross seems to have the same view; see RG 20 n. 1, 30.
61 For this interpretation of Sidgwick’s epistemology, whom Rashdall may be following, see Robert
Shaver, Rational Egoism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 62–71. For worries about Shaver’s
interpretation, see Anthony Skelton, ‘Schultz’s Sidgwick’, Utilitas, 19 (2007), and ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Moral
Epistemology’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 48 (2010).
62 Moore, PE 158. This seems to be T. H. Green’s view; see Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883), sec. 332. Sidgwick sides with Rashdall; see Sidgwick,ME 8–9.
63 G. E. Moore, ‘Review of The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy’, Hibbert Journal, 6
(1907–8), 449, italics in original. Although Moore’s tone in this review is less than effusive, he later warmed
to the book. In Ethics, he says that if the reader wishes ‘to become acquainted with the principal works on
Ethics which have been written by writers still living, I think I can hardly do better than recommend him to
read, first of all, Dr. Hastings Rashdall’s Theory of Good and Evil’ (p. 157).
64 For this point, see Thomas Hurka, ‘Moore in the Middle’, Ethics, 113 (2003), 616 n. 72.
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hedonistic utilitarianism because the former is able to capture common-sense ‘duties or
virtues’ which are ‘incapable of being reconciled’ with the latter (TGE 1.188, 189). He
has in mind especially the particular virtues of purity, temperance, veracity, and
humility, among others.
In the case of purity and temperance his arguments are not convincing. For Rashdall,
the virtue of purity is the promotion of ‘a state of feeling which the clearest moral
insight and the highest spiritual experience of the race have decided to be incompatible
with sexual indulgence outside a relatively permanent monogamous union’ (TGE
1.197). It is in dealing with this virtue, Rashdall writes, ‘that hedonistic-utilitarian
explanations of Morality break down most hopelessly’ (TGE 1.197). This is too hasty.
In his discussion of purity, Sidgwick, for example, says that we must place a high value
on purity if we are to maintain that ‘higher type of sexual relations’ and to contribute to
‘the maintenance . . . of the permanent unions which are held to be necessary for the
proper rearing and training of children’.65 The requirement of purity forbids ‘all extra-
nuptial intercourse of the sexes’.66 Indeed, ‘the Virtue of Purity may be regarded as
providing a necessary shelter under which that intense and elevated affection between
the sexes, which is most conducive both to the happiness of the individual and to the
wellbeing of the family, may grow and flourish’.67 Because the impulse that purity
regulates is ‘so powerful and so sensitive to stimulants of all kinds . . . the aversion to
impurity must extend far beyond the acts that primarily need to be prohibited, and
include in its scope everything (in dress, language, social customs, etc.) which may tend
to excite lascivious ideas’.68 This seems to suggest that on the question of purity,
hedonistic and ideal utilitarian views are quite close in their implications.69 They are at
least close enough that the case is not as easy as Rashdall makes it out to be.
There may be some differences between Sidgwick and Rashdall on purity. Rashdall
insists that the only permissible sexual relations occur within the confines of monoga-
mous and relatively permanent marriage (TGE 1.197, 198). Sidgwick avoids stating
that monogamous marriage is the only place in which it is permissible to have sex, and
the fact that he says that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with sex outside of
marriage makes the view more rather than less plausible.70 If Sidgwick’s view turns
out to lead to a more relaxed account of purity and therefore more ‘impurity’ than he
lets on, then this seems to imply that it has an advantage over ideal utilitarianism. Our
current views of sexual relations seem to be more rather than less in line with
hedonistic utilitarianism.
In the case of temperance, Rashdall claims that ideal utilitarianism forbids drunken-
ness (TGE 1.99, 202–3; E 70). This is a benefit to ideal utilitarianism because ‘the
65 Sidgwick, ME 452, 450. 66 Ibid. 450.
67 Ibid. 452. 68 Ibid. 453.
69 What Sidgwick says also suggests that, paceRashdall, the two have similar implications for divorce (TGE
1.200).
70 Sidgwick, ME 358.
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healthy moral consciousness does condemn as intrinsically degrading even the most
occasional act of deliberate drunkenness’ (TGE 1.203; also 99). Rashdall may be right
that on the issue of drunkenness hedonistic utilitarianism is more liberal than ideal
utilitarianism. But it is far from clear that this is a mark against it. Surely, an occasional
act of deliberate drunkenness which will not knowingly lead to alcoholism or other
obvious malfeasance is not wrong in itself.71 In reply, Rashdall might remind us of his
account of drunkenness: ‘the voluntary extinction of consciousness and self-control for
no purpose but momentary pleasure or satisfaction of impulse’ (TGE 1.203 n. 2). The
danger with this reply is the narrowness of the definition, for the narrower the
definition of drunkenness the more likely it is that we will see no difference between
hedonistic and ideal utilitarianism in terms of their practical judgements about it. If the
loss of consciousness and self-control is great the hedonist can plausibly argue that this
sort of drunkenness is forbidden because of its long-term negative effects, which would
seem to be considerable. If the loss is not great because the drunkenness is merely
occasional, it is unclear what the problem appears to be. Again, the hedonistic utilitari-
an seems to be closer to our current views than the ideal utilitarian.
Rashdall’s appeal to common-sense opinions (prevalent at his time) on matters of
purity and temperance does not attract us to his view. Fortunately, he may be able to
distance himself from them. He notes that we are not infallible judges on moral matters
(TGE 1.145). To combat error, we need a mechanism for ‘distinguishing mere feelings
or aversions which may be only prejudices due to inheritance or environment or
superstition from real judgements of value’ (TGE 1.211–12; also 85; E 54–5). He
suggests a ‘test’, which begins by asking ourselves the following question: ‘does the
spontaneous aversion or apparent intuition disappear after full reflection upon the act
itself as well as upon all circumstances and consequences?’ (TGE 1.212).72 If one’s
answer is affirmative, then the judgement is put aside; if one’s answer is negative, then
the judgement stands. Rashdall might argue that on sober reflection the judgements
regarding purity and temperance turn out not to be authentic judgements of value, but,
rather, ‘only prejudices due to inheritance or environment or superstition’ (TGE
1.211).73 In the case of purity, Rashdall can simply drop the emotion or feeling
which he says the virtue of purity promotes. He can avoid the worries about his
view by divesting himself of an intrinsic value (or at least aspects of it) that he sometimes
lists together with the intrinsic values of virtue, intellectual activity, and mere pleasant
feeling, namely, ‘various kinds of affection or social emotion’ (E 70; also TGE 2.37).
The value that purity apparently promotes is obviously a kind of affection or emotion.
Since this turns out not to reflect a real judgement of value, it would be put aside as per
71 Ibid. 329: ‘it would be going too far to state, as a maxim supported by Common Sense in respect of
sensual pleasures generally, that they are never to be sought except when [sic] they positively promote those of
a higher kind.’ Rashdall thinks that drunkenness is justified only if it promotes some greater good (E 58–9).
72 In this context, Rashdall defines ‘intuition’ as ‘an apparently unaccountable repugnance to some kind of
conduct’ (TGE 1.212).
73 It is interesting to compare his objection to drunkenness with his lax attitude on smoking (TGE 1.93).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2011, SPi
60 ANTHONY SKELTON
Rashdall’s test. In the case of temperance things may be a little less clear, because the
judgement about drunkenness may follow from his views about intellectual values. But
perhaps this is not a problem if he means to rule out only the type of drunkenness
outlined above (though, as noted, in this case he no longer has a clear advantage over
classical utilitarianism).
Rashdall can move from this defensive stance to a more offensive stance. He can
argue that armed with his three goods he can demonstrate that ideal utilitarianism is
superior to hedonistic utilitarianism given its coherence with (reflectively endorsed)
common-sense moral beliefs. This is particularly true of its practical directives regarding
the virtues of veracity and of humility.
As regards veracity, Rashdall maintains that, ‘upon hedonistic assumptions the
exceptions would be much more numerous than would commend themselves at
least to a well-brought-up Englishman’ (TGE 1.192). Veracity consists in loving the
truth and speaking the truth, and the value that it promotes is the correct use of our
rational faculties, those that enable us ‘to pursue, to communicate, and to love the
truth’ (TGE 1.193; also 188, 194). Rashdall notes that veracity admits of exceptions,
including ‘the actual deception practised by detectives, or by private persons towards a
brigand inquiring the whereabouts of his victim, or to the denial of bad news to sick
persons, or to lies told for the preservation of important secrets, or to the employment
of ancient formulae . . . which nobody takes quite literally’ (TGE 1.193; also 92–3). On
the face of it, there is no difference here with, for example, the hedonistic utilitarianism
of Sidgwick, who lists the same sort of exceptions (ME 315–16, 345, 448–9).
However, while it might be true that they accept some of the same kinds of
exceptions, further reflection would seem to suggest, pace Sidgwick, that hedonism
permits a greater number of exceptions to veracity than ideal utilitarianism. Rashdall
might, for instance, argue that his view does a much better job of explaining veracity in
public life. What makes it wrong for politicians and their cognates to lie to their citizens
is that in lying they delude and deceive their citizens, leaving them as a consequence less
likely to use their rational faculties properly and to make sound decisions. In addition, it
makes them (upon learning of the mendacity) less likely to appreciate and seek out the
truth, especially regarding political matters. This sort of behaviour tends to cause people
to be jaded and disengaged. In response, they tend to gravitate toward less important
matters (e.g. gossip and televised sporting events). It seems implausible to think that this
state of affairs would be desirable if it contained on balance more pleasure than the
option that Rashdall might advocate. Indeed, we think that a politician’s job is not to
provide us with comfortable delusions but (if necessary) bitter truth: it would be counter-
intuitive for a politician to consider what the balance of pleasure would be if she or he lied
before making public policy announcements in the vast majority of cases. The common-
sense view is that it is best to tell the truth unless untruth is required to prevent (for
example) serious loss of life or protect state secrets from being made known to those who
might do harm. A small increase in pleasure would not suffice. Rashdall’s view seems to
supply a highly plausible explanation of just these intuitions.
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Given this, it is ironic that in their dispute about clerical veracity Rashdall accuses
Sidgwick of being a ‘Kantian rigorist’.74 Both Rashdall and Sidgwick agree that
Anglican ministers do not have to conform to the literal interpretation of what they
express in making pledges and reciting creeds. However, Sidgwick thinks that if an
Anglican minister says ‘I believe in the virgin birth’, but he does not believe it, then he
is lying, and must therefore break his ties with the established church. His view is that
‘no gain in enlightenment and intelligence which the Anglican ministry may receive
from the presence of such [bright and thoughtful] men can compensate for the damage
done to moral habits and the offence given to moral sentiments by their example’.75
Rashdall thinks that the statement about the virgin birth can be interpreted to mean
something quite different from what it appears to mean, and much of his discussion in
reply to Sidgwick is spent trying to establish this and other similar facts.76 His more
serious disagreement is normative. Rashdall holds, contra Sidgwick, that the cost to
virtue and moral habits—‘a very small evil’—is outweighed by the gain in intelligence
and enlightenment that progressive ministers bring and that will help to preserve
the church, in its social and moral role.77 What is important here is that, whether or
not he is right, Rashdall can argue that his version of ideal utilitarianism is better able
to explain the dispute between the two. If Sidgwick is right, Rashdall can argue that
he is able to explain why Sidgwick’s position is the right one better than Sidgwick’s
own hedonistic utilitarianism, for his ideal utilitarianism grants that virtue is the most
important good and outweighs intellectual and other goods in some (and perhaps even
in these sorts of ) situations. Rashdall might strengthen his case by noting that on
Sidgwick’s own view the appeal to what might provide people with net pleasure plays
no or very little role in determining what Anglican ministers should do.78 If Rashdall is
right about the normative matter, on the other hand, that the intellectual benefits are
weightier, then again he can claim that his ideal utilitarianism provides the best
explanation, since it grants that in certain cases intellectual goods outweigh the
goods of virtue.
Rashdall suggests that humility is the due regulation of ‘pride or the high estimation
of self ’, resulting in an under-appreciation of one’s abilities (TGE 1.204). He thinks
74 Hastings Rashdall, ‘Professor Sidgwick on the Ethics of Religious Conformity: A Reply’, International
Journal of Ethics, 7 (1897), 138. This paper is a reply to Henry Sidgwick, ‘The Ethics of Religious Conformity’,
International Journal of Ethics, 6 (1896). For a response to Rashdall, see Henry Sidgwick, ‘Clerical Veracity’, in
Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays, ed. Sissela Bok (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
75 Sidgwick, ‘The Ethics of Religious Conformity’, 289.
76 Sidgwick is surely right that there is no way to interpret this statement so that a person uttering it under
these circumstances is not lying.
77 Rashdall, ‘Professor Sidgwick on the Ethics of Religious Conformity: A Reply’, 166.
78 Sidgwick might suggest that he is not here arguing as a hedonistic utilitarian: instead, he is employing
the method that he sketches in Practical Ethics for the purpose of doing practical ethics, which involves reliance
on the main rules of common-sense morality or ‘middle axioms’, not his brand of utilitarianism. This may not
help him, since Rashdall can still argue that his view is closer to common-sense morality than Sidgwick’s. For
discussion of Sidgwick’s practical ethics, see Sissela Bok, ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics’, Utilitas, 12
(2000), and Anthony Skelton, ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics: A Defence’, Utilitas, 18 (2006).
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that this presents the ideal utilitarian with a kind of puzzle. On the one hand, it insists
on a truthful assessment of one’s ‘own powers and merits’ (TGE 1.205); on the other, it
is cognizant of the troubles associated with pride or thinking too much of oneself. He
solves this conflict by arguing that we ought to aim at a truthful assessment of ourselves
because this is ‘most favourable to moral progress, to intellectual self-development, and
to social usefulness’ (ibid.), and that we ought not to spend too much time dwelling
‘with satisfaction’ on our own merits, for two reasons. First, because any plausible ideal
places too large a chasm between ‘ideal and the actual performance . . . even of a good
man to permit him any great self-complacency at the thought that he is better than the
majority of his neighbours’ (ibid.), and second, because ‘the good man cares too much
for others to derive pleasure from the thought that they are worse than himself ’ (TGE
1.206).
Two things seem right about Rashdall’s discussion. First, he does a nice job of
articulating why humility presents us with a problem. On the one hand, we think that
it is important to have a truthful assessment of our abilities and merits (if any) but, on
the other, we want to ensure that this does not interfere with further growth (virtuous
or otherwise) or other social relations. He provides a more compelling discussion of
humility than one which conducts the discussion wholly in terms of ‘social incon-
veniences’ of overestimating one’s abilities or pleasures associated with contemplating
them. Second, he seems to be able to capture why it is inappropriate to have estimates
that are too high and estimates that are too low. He can rightly explain that humility
rests in part on the fact that the virtuous person does not take pleasure in the fact that he
is better than other people, that there is something inappropriate about noting one’s
superior abilities and in taking pleasure in this fact. Indeed, he notes further that the
correct response (though not entirely without difficulty) consists in feeling sorrow that
others are unable to attain the same sort of status or possess the same merits. He can also
explain why it is a good thing to have a truthful assessment of one’s abilities and merits
even if this leads to discomfort and displeasure. He can explain why a woman who
thinks erroneously that she is best suited only to be a housewife ought to be brought to
a better assessment of her abilities even if this requires or entails a sacrifice in her degree
of contentment with her life.
There is one wrinkle in Rashdall’s argument against hedonistic utilitarianism. As
noted above, he is not afraid to thwart common-sense judgement in the case of his
views about right and wrong. He concedes that, in the case of the virtue of purity, ‘the
developed moral consciousness does seem most nearly to assume the form which
Intuitionism gives to all ethical precepts—that of a prohibition to do certain acts, a
prohibition which gives no further account of itself, and which positively forbids any
calculation of consequences or admission of exceptions’ (TGE 1.197). He is happy to
revise the judgement: ‘While strongly insisting that the moral consciousness in its
highest development does condemn all sexual indulgence outside monogamous mar-
riage, I should contend that this prohibition admits of being stated in the form of a
judgement as to the ultimate value of an end’ (ibid.). This is an example of a more
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2011, SPi
IDEAL UTIL ITARIANISM: RASHDALL AND MOORE 63
general strategy that Rashdall uses against the intuitionist (see e.g. TGE 1.92–3). He
notes that the latter declares that certain things are right or wrong and that this is the
end of the matter: we typically ‘pronounce judgements upon individual acts without
conscious reflection on the consequences to any one, still less on the ultimate con-
sequences to social well-being’ (E 51). He does not accept that this furnishes us with
reason to believe that these intuitions are a correct account of what it is right to do, or
for thinking that moral reasons (in this case) are deontological in nature. He writes that
‘the question is not so much as to the existence of intuitions or apparent intuitions
about conduct, but as to the source of their ultimate authority or validity, and
consequently as to their finality’ (E 52; italics in original). He goes on to impugn
their finality and validity.
He does not permit this move to the hedonist. We have seen that Rashdall is clearly
opposed to occasional drunkenness. He notes that the hedonist might explain the
wrongness by appeal to ‘remoter social ill consequences’ (TGE 1.203). He rejects this
explanation, for ‘we see the act to be intrinsically disgusting, and there is an end of the
matter’ (ibid.). This seems inconsistent. Why allow impugning explanations in the case
of common-sense deontological claims, but not in the case of common-sense axiolog-
ical claims? The same worry emerges in Rashdall’s treatment of hedonistic attempts to
explain the morality of veracity and the dubiety of bullfighting (TGE 1.192, 99). In the
case of veracity he maintains that ‘it is not necessary to deny that the encouragement
even of such intellectual pursuits as are of the least direct and obvious social utility does
lead to an increase of pleasure on the whole, but our feeling about them is not based
upon any such doubtful calculations’ (TGE 1.192). In his discussion of bullfighting,
Rashdall writes that if the pleasure generated by a bullfight outweighs the pain, ‘a
humane man would condemn the spectacle all the same. He will pronounce such
pleasures of inhumanity bad, quite apart from the somewhat dubious calculation that
the encouragement of inhumanity in one direction tends to callousness in another’
(TGE 1.99, also 73; E 66–7). But it surely is open to an intuitionist to say that certain
things seem wrong, for example, lying, injustice, and so on, because they are wrong,
not on account of some calculation, ‘dubious’ or otherwise, derived from ideal
utilitarianism.
Rashdall need not worry too much, it seems, about this argument, provided that
he can show that hedonism conflicts with reflective common-sense judgements. In
this case, he will not have to argue—as Prichard, Ross, and Carritt often do in their
attack on ideal utilitarianism—that even if it is not at odds with common-sense
morality, classical utilitarianism provides the wrong explanation of common-sense
moral claims. Since he might be accused of the same, he must be careful that his
worries about hedonistic utilitarianism are that it cannot capture certain reflective
common-sense moral beliefs rather than that it provides the wrong explanation of
these beliefs. In the case of veracity and humility, he seems to do just this.
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IV
Rashdall’s appeal to self-evidence and coherence with common-sense morality in his
argument for ideal utilitarianism distinguishes him from Moore. This is not all. This
argumentative strategy connects and makes him highly relevant to subsequent defences
of the view, where the attempt is to support it by noting how it is at least as close to
common-sense morality as its rivals. This is the strategy of, for example, the ideal
utilitarians W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, A. C. Ewing, and Oliver Johnson.79 Rashdall
therefore seems to make a more lasting and perhaps more significant contribution to
the defence of ideal utilitarianism than does Moore. But his defence is not entirely
continuous with more recent attempts to vindicate his position, for unlike Pickard-
Cambridge, Ewing, and Johnson, he does not (in earnest) attempt to defend ideal
utilitarianism against deontological rivals using this mechanism.80 His main attempt is
to show that ideal utilitarianism is more plausible than its hedonistic foe. This is
probably because Rashdall felt that deontological frameworks were not formidable
rivals. He did not anticipate Prichard and Ross. He is discontinuous in another way.
The subsequent defences of ideal utilitarianism attempt to argue that the view can
capture deontological intuitions or rival views by expanding the range of goods beyond
those of virtue, knowledge, and mere pleasant feeling, among other states of con-
sciousness.81 These views attempt to capture such intuitions by arguing that, for
example, justice is a good and that breaking a promise is an evil. Rashdall cannot do
this because he thinks that only states of consciousness have intrinsic value, and because
promise-breaking and justice are not states of consciousness they cannot be valuable.
Nevertheless, Rashdall did open up a new avenue for the defence of ideal utilitarian-
ism, which makes study of his works important to understanding the development and
the philosophical viability of this position.
79 See e.g. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, ‘Two Problems About Duty (I.)’,Mind, 41 (1932); ‘Two Problems
About Duty (II.)’, Mind, 41 (1932); ‘Two Problems About Duty (III.)’, Mind, 41 (1932); Ewing, ‘Recent
Developments’; Oliver A. Johnson, Rightness and Goodness (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959) and
‘Rightness, Moral Obligation, and Goodness’, Journal of Philosophy, 50 (1953).
80 Sometimes Rashdall suggests this defence (TGE 1.72–3, 97).
81 This is the strategy of Ewing and Johnson; see also Susan Brennan, ‘Ross, Promises, and the Intrinsic
Value of Acts’, Lyceum, 1 (1989), and Robert Shaver’s chapter in this volume (Chap. 7).
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